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What is the relation between power and life and 
death? How does scholarship on biopower and 
biopolitics reshape our understanding of the hu-
man being and the political? From the vantage 
point of the interpretations of Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan made by Michel Foucault and Giorgio 
Agamben, this article tries to answer these ques-
tions, and to understand the differences between 
the model of sovereignty and the new emerging 
model of biopolitics. 
Th e study of the intersection between power and life and 
death – the so-called biopolitical question – is a new and 
innovative area of research within political theory. Biopo-
litical research has begun to rearrange the basic categories 
of both politics and human life, off ering novel insights on 
diverse topics from modern warfare (Dillon & Reid, 2009) 
and humanitarian aid (Fassin, 2011), to the contemporary 
fi nancial crisis (Cooper, 2010), biomedicine and bioeth-
ics (Rose, 2007; Mills, 2011). Besides empirical attempts 
to understand life and death in relation to power, theo-
retical eff orts have been made to further develop Michel 
Foucault’s biopolitical theorizations from the 1970’s, 
diagnosing late modernity as the age of thanatopolitics 
(Esposito, 2008), necropolitics (Mbembe, 2003) or the 
camp (Agamben, 1998). But how does biopower diff er 
from notions of sovereignty? Which novel conceptions of 
politics and the subject does biopolitics off er?
From the outset, the biopolitical paradigm is devel-
oped as a critique of classical sovereignty. One can follow 
the trajectory of Foucault’s thought – from Discipline and 
Punish (1975) over History of Sexuality (1976) and ‘Soci-
ety Must be Defended’ (1976) to Security, Territory and 
Population (1977) – and observe how sovereignty and bio-
power functions in fundamentally diff erent ways with re-
gard to the object of power, the power techniques and the 
instruments of power. As the model of sovereign power 
has been at the core of political thought (at least) from 
Th omas Hobbes to Max Weber, the articulation of bio-
power and biopolitics as oppositional to sovereign power 
suggests new ways of conceiving the political and the 
human being. Th e hallmark of the model of sovereignty 
is Th omas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), in which the hu-
man being as a political subject and political interaction 
between human beings receive its distinctively modern 
conceptualization. Th is conceptualization is acquired by 
a fundamental theoretical distinction between the state 
of nature and the state of society, and a corresponding 
fundamental diff erence in human nature and human in-
teraction in the two states. Interestingly, the two most 
important biopolitical thinkers both deliver novel inter-
pretations of Hobbes’ state of nature. Foucault shows in 
‘Society Must be Defended’ that the state of nature is not 
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a state of war (Foucault, 1997: 89-111) and substitutes 
the Hobbesian fi gure of the savage with the fi gure of the 
barbarian, and Giorgio Agamben discusses in Homo Sacer 
(1998) the fi gure of the werewolf as opposed to Hobbes’ 
homo homini lupus (Agamben, 1998: 104-111). Th is pre-
occupation with the state of nature and the theorist of 
sovereignty par excellence suggests that the biopolitical 
paradigm can be investigated through these interpreta-
tions of Hobbes. Precisely because of the theoretical dif-
ferences between biopolitics and sovereignty, Hobbes and 
his state of nature off ers a privileged vantage point for 
understanding the biopolitical condition. 
By analysing and comparing Foucault’s and Agam-
ben’s diff erent interpretations of the state of nature, the 
article aim at discussing the following question: Which 
novel conceptions of the political and human nature are 
off ered by the biopolitical paradigm in contrast to the 
model of sovereignty? 
First, I will situate the article within the literature, 
comparing the argument to Andrew Neal (2004), George 
Pavlich (2009) and Katia Genel (2006), who in diff erent 
ways have sought to illuminate the question of biopoli-
tics through Foucault and Agamben’s reinterpretation of 
Hobbes. Secondly, I will provide the interpretation of 
Hobbes’ state of nature, which Foucault and Agamben 
writes against and discuss its achievements as a theoreti-
cal intervention. Th irdly, in the main part of the article, 
I will compare the interpretations of the state of nature 
made by Foucault and Agamben, and lastly I will discuss 
the broader implications of the biopolitical interpreta-
tions of Hobbes.
Hobbes’ State of Nature and the 
Anthropological Machine
Th is article is not the fi rst attempt to understand biopoli-
tics through Foucault’s and Agamben’s interpretations of 
Hobbes, and I share to a certain extent the same aspira-
tion as earlier attempts. Katia Genel, for example, char-
acterizes the reinterpretation of Hobbes as a „perpetual 
defi nition or redefi nition of the human“, and she identify 
the question of biopolitics with a „particular junction be-
tween two terms, power and life, which requires that both 
be redefi ned“ (Genel, 2006: 44). Andrew Neal, who em-
phasize Foucault’s newly translated lectures ‘Society Must 
Be Defended’1, also focuses on political power beyond 
the Hobbesian model (Neal, 2004: 375), but concentrates 
more on the exception in Schmitt, Benjamin and Agam-
ben. In contrast to these interpretations of biopolitics this 
article is concerned with a much deeper textual analysis 
of Leviahtan in order to understand the detailed mechan-
ics of biopolitics in relation to sovereignty and political 
subjectivity. Th us, my approach is closer to George Pav-
lich, and as such I agree with his statement that the „en-
gagement with the Leviathan implies subtle ways in which 
Hobbes continues, after several centuries, to provide the 
founding backdrop to the respective attempts to think power 
beyond sovereignty“ (Pavlich, 2009: 23). But in contrast 
to Pavlich, my engagement with Leviathan centers on 
one specifi c element of the Hobbesian theory of sover-
eignty, namely the state of nature. Th is is due to the fact 
that both Foucault and Agamben discusses the concept 
at quite some length, but foremost because of the theo-
retical role, which the state of nature plays in Hobbes’ 
construction of sovereign power and political subjectivity. 
Th erefore, I now turn to the Hobbesian state of nature.   
As the opening quote of the article by Derrida sug-
gests, sovereignty has often been portrayed as animalistic 
or monstrous. Th is fact may come as a surprise since poli-
tics from Aristotle to Hannah Arendt has been concep-
tualized as a capacity and a form of interaction restricted 
solely to human beings. It is my fundamental claim in 
this section of the article that politics as an activity re-
stricted to human beings and the politics of the state is 
exactly the theoretical achievement of Leviathan.
In order to justify this claim, I will provide an in-
terpretation of Leviathan made by Sheldon Wolin and 
Noberto Bobbio, and mainly focus on the radical diff er-
ences in human nature and human interaction, which oc-
cur as the state of nature is replaced by the state of society 
and sovereign power emerges. As Derrida suggests „… 
questions of the animal and the political, of man and beast in 
the context of the state, the polis, the city, the republic, the so-
cial body, the law in general“ cannot be preceded „without 
recognizing some privileges to the fi gure of the ‘Wolf ’.“ (Der-
rida, 2009: 9). Th us we will begin with Hobbes’ famous 
expression homo homini lupus. Th e condition of man as a 
wolf to man and the all-encompassing war in the state of 
nature rises due to equality in strength and the competi-
tion for scarce resources, and thus the state of nature is 
without any form of civilization or cultural productions: 
„… there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof 
is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no 
navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported 
by sea, …, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account 
of time, no arts, no letters, no society“ (Hobbes, 1994: 76). 
Furthermore, the notions of justice or a common good do 
not exist, and instead the human beings, in constant fear 
of each other, preserve their uncertain lives as aggressive 
wolves of the forest. Th is completely changes when the 
covenant is reached and sovereign power is established. A 
common sense of justice now prevails, a system of private 
property and rule of law is constructed2 (Hobbes, 1994: 
114), a private sphere with negative freedom is set up 
(Hobbes, 1994: 143) and fi nally – and most importantly 
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– the human being becomes a political subjects with both 
obligations and rights towards the sovereign (Hobbes, 
1994: 144). 
Th is transition from the state of nature to society has 
important implications for the later discussion on biopoli-
tics, insofar as a radical change in human subjectivity and 
human interaction occurs. For Wolin, the transition from 
one state to another is designed to overcome the „mere 
nature“ of human life in the state of nature (Wolin, 1970: 
25); to escape the „biological absurdity“ of the natural state 
in order to obtain „the highest level of human achievement, 
life in civilized society“ (Wolin, 2004: 235, 237).
Th us, the construction of sovereign power transforms 
the human being from his animal-like condition into a 
political subject with rights and duties, freedoms and 
obligations3. Furthermore, the construction of sovereign 
power ends the permanent war and gives rise to a society 
almost similar to a liberal market economy with „… the 
liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one 
another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their 
own trade of life“ (Hobbes, 1994:138), and additionally it 
provides the division between the private and the public 
sphere: „In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, 
there the subject hath the liberty to do or forbear, according 
to his own discretion“ (Hobbes, 1994: 143). 
In sum, the social contract and the established sov-
ereign power creates the individualistic political subject 
and the politics of the state4. Again, this interpretation is 
in line with that of Wolin, who describes „the enormous 
diff erence between the chaotic state of nature and civil soci-
ety“ as a diff erence between ‘mere nature’ and the „busy 
and industrious men“ of the civil state (Wolin, 1970: 24). 
Noberto Bobbio has made a similar interpretation of Le-
viathan as he like Wolin – and in agreement with this 
article’s argument – also concentrates on the radical dif-
ference between the two states, and understands Hobbes’ 
binary schema as „a dichotomy, which is extremely clear and 
simple“ (Bobbio, 1993: 197). Th e simplicity and clearness 
of the Hobbesian models lies in man’s transcendence of his 
fl awed animal life and attainment of a qualifi ed, political 
life: „For Hobbes, the state is one of these machines produced 
by human beings in order to compensate for the shortcomings 
of nature, and to replace the defi cient products of nature with 
a product of human ingenuity“ (Bobbio, 1993: 36).
As extremely important for the biopolitical reinter-
pretation of Hobbes, these two co-existing moves – the 
transformation of human nature and human interaction 
– simultaneously produces the binary oppositions, which 
the model of sovereignty rest upon: nature versus society, 
public versus private, war versus peace, right versus law, 
obligation versus protection, sovereign versus subject and 
man versus animal. 
As the other opening quote by Agamben suggests, the 
distinction between man and animal is the fundamen-
tal metaphysico-political operation, which produces man. 
Agamben proposes that the production of man happens 
through what he calls the anthropological machine5, a ma-
chine where „… man is the animal that must recognize 
itself as human to be human“ (Agamben, 2004: 26). Even 
though man „… sees his own image (as) always already 
deformed in the features of an ape … (he) must recognize 
himself in a non-human in order to be human“ (Agamben, 
2004: 27). Th us, Hobbes performs the theoretical opera-
tion of letting the social contract work as an Agambenian 
anthropological machine, which not only produces man 
in contrast to the animal, but produces a specifi c version 
of man: the individual with rights and duties towards 
the sovereign.
Derrida supports this reading, when he points to the 
fact that „… the contract at the origin of sovereignty ex-
cludes God just as much … as it excludes the beast“ (Der-
rida, 2009: 4696). As both beasts and Gods are outside 
the contract, as the sovereign law neither applies to any 
of them, a distinct space for human beings as political 
subjects and human interaction as state politics is con-
structed. Or with the Aristotelian distinction between 
zoé and bios: the state of society and the sovereign law, 
while applying only to man and not to beasts and Gods, 
are the theoretical operation, which transforms zoé7 into 
bios, and thus makes politics possible. 
Th us, the main achievement of Hobbes’ operation is 
the construction of an unambiguously and well-defi ned 
realm, where man as a political subject interacts with 
other political subjects through exchange relations and 
the rule of law. It is exactly this unambiguously and well-
defi ned realm and conception of man, which Foucault 
and Agamben discusses and criticizes.
Th e Savage and the Barbarian: Foucault’s 
Interpretation of the State of Nature
Foucault only discusses Hobbes’ state of nature in depth 
one time in his entire oeuvre. Th is is done in his lectures 
at College de France in 1975-1976, ‘Society Must be De-
fended’. Foucault explicitly understands his own endeav-
our as an attempt „to abandon the model of Leviathan … 
to study power outside the model of Leviathan“ (Foucault, 
2003: 34). Tellingly, in order go beyond sovereignty, in 
order to understand political power after sovereignty, 
Foucault analyzes the Hobbesian state of nature. His 
interpretation is quite diff erent from the one provided 
above, because Foucault states that there never really was 
a war in the state of nature, and thus that complete sov-
ereignty is not reached in the state of society: „Th ere are 
no battles in Hobbes’ primitive war, there is no blood and 
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there are no corpses … We are in a theatre where presenta-
tions are exchanged, in a relationship of fear in which there 
are no limits; we are not really involved in war“ (Foucault, 
2003: 92). Th us the state of nature is characterised by a 
‘cold war’ where the participants acts as if they are prepar-
ing for war, even though war never comes. Th is mode of 
interaction will not be abandoned, when sovereign power 
is instituted – Foucault gives the example from Leviathan 
where people, even in the state of society, are locking their 
doors and protecting their homes – precisely because it is 
not complete sovereignty, which is established (Foucault, 
2003: 95). Th erefore, there are no qualitative diff erence 
between the state of nature and the state of society, as 
the same logics govern the two states: „It doesn’t matter 
whether you fought or did not fi ght, whether you been beaten 
or not; in any case, the mechanism that applies to you who 
have been defeated is the same mechanism that we fi nd in 
the state of nature, and in the constitution of the state“ (Fou-
cault, 2003: 97). Th is interpretation of the state of nature 
focuses on one of the important theoretical implications 
of Leviathan, namely the transformation in human in-
teraction from the war of all against all to the politics of 
the sovereign state. 
Th e other important theoretical transformation, 
which was discussed in relation to Hobbes, is the trans-
formation of human nature and the construction of the 
political subject. Foucault does not discuss the transfor-
mation of human nature when he reinterprets the state of 
nature, but later in the lectures he criticizes the discourse 
of Hobbesian sovereignty „… with its contracts, its savages, 
its men of the prairies and the forests, its state of nature and 
its war of every man against every man“ (Foucault, 2003: 
215). Instead of Hobbes’ savage man, Foucault suggests 
the fi gure of the barbarian. Th e fundamental theoretical 
achievement for Hobbes, when transforming the savage 
man into the political subject, was the simultaneously 
construction of a system of rights and capitalist exchange. 
Th is analysis is very similar to Foucault’s description of 
the role of the savage in the discourse of sovereignty: „… 
the savage is essentially a man who exchanges … he exchange 
rights and he exchanges goods. Insofar as he exchanges rights, 
he founds society and sovereignty. Insofar as he exchanges 
goods, he constitutes a social body which is, at the same 
time, an economic body“ (Foucault, 2003: 194). Th erefore, 
the savage man is the necessary theoretical construction 
for establishing the political subject with rights and eco-
nomic activities, and as the savage enter into social rela-
tions, „he ceases to be savage“ (Foucault, 2003: 195) and 
is radically transformed. Foucault’s barbarian is the com-
plete opposite: He is a fi gure of history; he does not exist 
in nature, but always in relation to civilization and soci-
ety, which he is excluded from. Th e barbarian „… does 
not make his entrance into history by founding society, but 
by penetrating a civilization, setting it ablaze and destroying 
it“ (Foucault, 2003: 195). Th is means that no transforma-
tion happens to the barbarian when he encounters society 
and the sovereign; the barbarian does not exchange his 
natural right to everything with civil rights and the right 
to property. In short, the barbarian does not loose his 
freedom when he encounters sovereign power: „… in his 
relationship with power, the barbarian, unlike the savage, 
never surrenders his freedom“ (Foucault, 2003: 196). In 
the barbarian’s relation to sovereign power, he does not 
transfer his natural freedom and natural rights to the sov-
ereign in order to achieve protection and limited rights, 
but rather he is in a relation of freedom and ambiguity. 
Th e most signifi cant diff erence in Foucault’s interpre-
tation of Hobbes is that neither of the two transforma-
tions – the transformation of human nature and human 
interaction – takes place. Th us, the well-defi ned and 
unambiguous space for man and politics, which Hob-
bes created, is called into question. Foucault does not 
examine the relationship between man and animal, as 
Derrida and Agamben does, but instead he describes the 
intermediate fi gure of the barbarian. As I see it, Foucault’s 
analysis of the state of nature and the barbarian is his 
fi rst attempt to theorise governmentality, which otherwise 
fi rst appears in the 1977-78 lectures. In these lectures 
governmentality is theorised as the exercise of power over 
a population at the level of biology, of the human being 
as a species and fi nally – just like the barbarian – power 
is exercised over free individuals, power is the conduct of 
conduct (Foucault, 2007). In the model of sovereignty 
the subject could be fully controlled and determined by 
the sovereign, take for example the picturesque opening 
scene of Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1995: 3-7), but 
the barbarian cannot be controlled, or he will not obey 
because of the treat of death. Th us, the attempt to govern 
the human being – not in the fi gure of the obedient sav-
age/subject, but the barbarian – is what establishes the 
new biopower: „… the ancient right to take life or let die 
(the sovereign power over the savage/subject) was replaced 
by the power to foster life or disallow to the point of death 
(the attempt to control the barbarian/the free subject) 
(Foucault, 1990: 138).
In this way, Foucault’s diff erent interpretation of 
Hobbes’ state of nature and his substitution of the savage 
for the barbarian is linked to his general genealogy of 
power from sovereignty to biopolitics. 
Th e Werewolf: Agamben’s Interpretation of the 
State of Nature
In the beginning of Homo Sacer Agamben let us know 
that the biopolitical paradigm, which Foucault describes 
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as a distinctive feature of modernity, is in fact as old as 
sovereignty itself, because sovereignty has always been ex-
ercised over life (Agamben, 1998: 6). Th erefore it is „nec-
essary to reconsider the sense of the Aristotelian defi nition of 
the polis as the opposition between life (zén) and good life (eu 
zén)“ (Agamben, 1998: 7). Even though Hobbes diff er 
from Aristotle in terms of the nature of scientifi c explana-
tions, the Aristotelian polis and the Hobbesian common-
wealth, as we have seen, both functions as anthropologi-
cal machines, which produce the binaries between man 
and animal, nature and society. Th us, Agamben’s objec-
tive in Homo Sacer is as much a reconsideration of Hob-
bes as of Aristotle, and the reinterpretation is obviously 
important for Agamben, as it is only in the intersection 
between sovereignty and bare life that „… the Hobbesian 
mythologeme of the state of nature acquire its true sense“ 
(Agamben, 1998: 105). 
Whereas Foucault’s interpretation of the state of na-
ture to some extent made the transformation of human 
nature and human interaction, which sovereignty rest 
upon, impossible; Agamben’s interpretation is even more 
radical. As the power of the sovereign in Agamben’s un-
derstanding is based on the generalisation of the Schmit-
tian exception, there is no real diff erence between a state 
of nature, a state of society and a state of exception. Th us, 
according to Agamben, the state of nature survives in 
society, precisely because the sovereign still has the natu-
ral right to punish and to exercise violence with impu-
nity (Agamben, 1998: 35). Th is indeterminacy between 
nature and society, between forest and city, means that 
instead of the transition from wolf to political subject, 
man is to be understood as a werewolf, as „a monstrous 
hybrid of human and animal – the werewolf – is, therefore, 
in its origin the fi gure of man who has been banned from the 
city … the werewolf, who is precisely neither man nor beast, 
and who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging 
to neither“ (Agamben, 1998: 105). Exactly because the 
sovereign in Leviathan still has the ultimate right to exer-
cise violence, exactly because he can kill his subjects with 
impunity, the werewolf is another expression of homo 
sacer. As the werewolf is neither a beast, and therefore 
not completely outside the law, nor a human being, and 
therefore protected by the law „ … the Hobbesian state 
of nature is the exception … in which everyone is thus the 
wargus“ (Agamben, 1998: 106). 
Th is has profound consequences for the two trans-
formations (of human nature and human interaction), 
which trajectory have been followed throughout the 
article. In his analysis of Hobbes, Agamben’s attack on 
sovereign power is devastating as we must „reread from 
the beginning the myth of the foundation of the modern city 
from Hobbes to Rousseau“ (Agamben, 1998: 109), and the 
result according to Agamben is that „All representations 
of the originary political act as a contract or a convention 
marking the passage from nature to the State in a discrete 
and defi nite way must be wholly left behind“ (Agamben, 
1998: 109). It is obvious that the main achievement of 
Leviathan – the defi nitive passage from nature to soci-
ety and its entire vocabulary of social contracts, citizens’ 
rights and free will – must be abandoned in Agamben’s 
fi gure of the werewolf, because of the sovereign’s right to 
kill with impunity. Th erefore the relation between the 
subject and the sovereign is not a voluntary contractual 
relationship; society is not reached by a covenant made 
by rational individuals, but instead the relationship is 
characterised by the ban, by the abandonment of the law. 
Hereby Agamben has achieved the complete deconstruc-
tion of Aristotle’s polis and Hobbes’ commonwealth; he 
has generalised the exception and replaced the binaries of 
the sovereign model with a zone of total inseparability: 
„Th e foundation is thus not an event achieved once and for 
all but is continually operative in the civil state in form of 
the sovereign decision“, and thus achieved is „the bare life of 
the homo sacer and the wargus, a zone of indistinction and 
continuous transition between man and beast, nature and 
culture“ (Agamben, 1998: 109). 
Th e Biopolitics Against and Beyond
the Model of Sovereignty
I began the article by asking which distinctively biopo-
litical conceptions of the human being and the political 
that emerged from Foucault’s and Agamben’s engage-
ment with Hobbes – or in short, how can the human 
being and politics be understood beyond sovereignty. Th is 
investigation has led to two diff erent modes of conceptu-
alising man and power: on one the hand a model, which 
can be called the transitional model of sovereignty, and on 
the other hand the non-transitional model of biopolitics. 
In the following, I will discuss these two models as they 
illuminate the question of the biopolitical conception of 
man and politics.
As argued, the theoretical intervention of Leviathan 
is the transition from nature to society, and the result is 
the construction of the binary oppositions, which the 
model of sovereignty rests upon. Th e most important 
achievement is the individualistic political subject with 
rights and duties, freedoms and obligations and the si-
multaneously construction of a public sphere governed 
by a system of positive laws, and a private sphere with 
the negative freedom for the individual. Th us the transi-
tion from nature to society happens once and for all, 
and it defi nitively changes human nature and human 
interaction.
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I will argue that the transitional model is applied 
very clearly by Hobbes, and then repeated throughout the 
canon of political theory. If we, as Agamben urge us to 
do, reread the foundation of the modern city from Hob-
bes to Rousseau, it is obvious that the transitional model 
is literally at work in both Locke’s Two Treatises of Gov-
ernment (1689) and Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality (1754) and Th e Social Contract (1762), but if we 
furthermore look at contemporary political thinkers, we 
can identify the transitional model as well. In John Rawls’ 
reinvigoration of political liberalism in Th eory of Justice 
(1971), the outcome of the rational discourse behind the 
veil of ignorance, is believed to profoundly change the 
individuals’ conception of justice and redistribution, as 
a transformation has taken place from individual self-
interest to the recognition of shared principles of justice8.
Th us, I think it is clear how Leo Strauss could entitle 
Hobbes as the founder of modern political philosophy, 
namely because he – in a very remarkable and powerful 
way – is the founder of the transitional model and the 
originator of the foundational distinctions of the sov-
ereign model: subject/sovereign, man/animal, rights/vio-
lence, freedom/obedience and so on.
In stark opposition to the transitional model we have 
the non-transitional model of biopolitics. It has been the 
aim of the article to show as literally as possible, through 
the engagement with very specifi c textual passage in the 
work of Foucault and Agamben, how a non-transitional 
model functions. In short, the non-transitional model 
tries to stop the autonomous working of the anthropo-
logical machine. Or with Agamben’s words: „Th e concepts 
of sovereignty and constituent power, which are at the core 
of our tradition, have to be abandoned or, at least, to be 
thought all over again. Th ey mark, in fact, the point of 
indiff erence between right and violence, nature and logos, 
proper and improper“ (Agamben, 2000: 111). What the 
non-transitional model has to off er, and what I have ex-
emplifi ed with the interpretations of Hobbes by Foucault 
and Agamben, is that no transition or a repeated failure 
of transition takes place, and therefore man and animal, 
nature and society inhabits a zone of indeterminacy. Just 
as the transitional model is visible in the trajectory of 
political thought, I will argue that what many so-called 
radical (political) thinkers have in common is exactly the 
adherence to the non-transitional model. When – for ex-
ample – Jacques Lacan describes the continuing failure of 
the signifi er to signify the Real, when Ernesto Laclau & 
Chantal Mouff e describes the over-determination of the 
symbolic fi eld as the precondition for discursive struggles, 
or when Gilles Deleuze discusses the repetitive process of 
Becoming Animal, what they are aiming at is precisely 
the lack of successful transition from animal to political 
subject, or the lack of constructing a stable subject, once 
and for all. In other words: Th ey are applying a non-
transitional model rather than a transitional one. 
Th is leads to the last question of the article. If the 
political subject and the politics of the state was the 
achievement of Hobbes and the transitional model, what 
conception of man and politics does biopolitics and the 
non-transitional model off er us? What is beyond sov-
ereignty? Th is is obviously the question Foucault and 
Agamben grabbles with, when they in diff erent ways ar-
ticulate the need for leaving aside the vocabulary of the 
sovereign model, and it is just as clear that this vocabulary 
is impotent when facing new political and ethical con-
cerns and concepts such as organ harvesting, cloning, 
eugenics, bio-citizenship, somatic selves and euthanasia. 
What is – for example – the status of individual rights 
when the individual and life is being redefi ned? How does 
capitalist exchange of organs and other organic material 
challenge individualism and tolerance? How does new 
techniques of surveillance and confi nement challenge the 
open liberal society? In short, what is the result of the 
reconfi guration of the individual in biopolitics? What are 
the characteristics of politics and power in biopolitics? 
Th is is a question too vast to answer defi nitively, but in 
the light of the juxtaposition of the transitional and the 
non-transitional model, I dare a preliminary answer. Th e 
human being of biopolitics is a being that have lost the 
sacredness of personhood, rights and individuality. It is 
a being, which is either a part of a population, thus only 
seen in relation to averages and means, to fl ows and se-
curity and not its own individuality (Foucault), or it is a 
hybrid between man and animal, imbuing bare life and 
constantly in fear of the power of the sovereign (Agam-
ben). Th e living being of the non-transitional model, in 
short, is a being, which is in the process of becoming 
human, but never completely succeeds in this transfor-
mation. Agamben suggests that „… the relations between 
animals and man will take on a new form, and that man 
himself will be reconciled with his animal nature“ (Agam-
ben, 2004: 3). Agamben is certainly right that the rela-
tions have taken a new form, and thus the concept of the 
political and the activity of politics have changed. But it 
is not obvious that biopolitics is a reconciliation with our 
animal nature. Rather as Foucault and Agamben himself 
shows diff erently, power now aims directly at a biologi-
cal component, at the zoé of the human being. Power 
operates through a calculation of biological, organic and 
molecular parameters, completely ignoring the formal 
rights of the juridical person. As the subject have been 
abandoned in favour of biological and molecular pro-
cesses within the human, so has sovereign power with 
its hierarchical relations and individual rights been com-
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plemented and to some extent replaced by a much more 
all-encompassing biopower, which leaves no aspect of hu-
man life unaff ected. It is telling that the diagnoses of the 
contemporary age given by the biopolitical scholarship 
are extremely pessimistic equating modernity with the 
concentration camp as Agamben does in Homo Sacer, or 
reversing Foucault’s politics of life into a politics of death 
as for example Roberto Esposito and Achille Mbembe 
does. Future research would benefi t from a more posi-
tive and constructive understanding of the new condi-
tions, which face individuals and political life in the age 
biopolitics focusing more on resistance and biopolitical 
self-creation.
Conclusion
Th e trail of investigation pursued in this article have 
been complicated, because it for obvious reasons is prob-
lematic to discuss an entire academic fi eld in the light of 
two interpretations of Hobbes’ Leviathan. Nonetheless, 
the investigation have illuminated (a part of) the basic 
structure of the biopolitical paradigm, and (a part of) 
the basic structure of the sovereign model. After all, it is 
not surprising that Foucault and Agamben turn to Hob-
bes and Leviathan, when they develop their theories of 
biopower, biopolitics and sovereignty. For with Hobbes 
– as also Wolin and Bobbio make clear – the transition 
from nature to society, from animal to man is delivered 
in the most clear-cut version imaginable, and the politi-
cal subject, the politics of the state and the entire lan-
guage of sovereignty with all its binary oppositions are 
established.
It is exactly the transition, which Foucault and Agam-
ben in their interpretations of Hobbes criticize and de-
construct. Th e critique and the failure of transition have 
been showed in detailed, textual analysis, and the article 
demonstrates how the lack of transition and transforma-
tion in human nature and human interaction challenge 
the language of classical sovereignty and pose questions 
about its applicability to empirical questions of politics 
in relation to life and death. Without the fi rm ground 
of the sovereign model, politics and human nature must 
be rethought and re-theorised, and it is exactly this re-
thinking of the human and our interactions, which the 
biopolitical paradigm is an attempt to. Th e last biopoliti-
cal attempt to rethink the most foundational concepts of 
political thought is certainly not given, but the hugely 
increasing theoretical and empirical research in biopoliti-
cal problems of life and death in relation to power, shows 
with great conviction that the sovereign understanding 
of power and individuality from Hobbes and on have 
to be replaced – or at least complemented – by novel 
understandings, which also encompasses our status as 
biological entities and the ways which biopower ignores 
the formal, juridical person and seeks to aff ect, control 
and dominate on the level biological life.  
Bibliography
Agamben, Giorgio 1998, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio 2000, Means Without End – Notes on Politics. Min-
nesota, University of Minnesota Press. 
Agamben, Giorgio 2004, Th e Open – Man and Animal. Stanford, Stan-
ford University Press.
Bobbio, Noberto 1993, Th omas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition. 
Chicago, Th e University of Chicago Press.
Cooper, Melinda 2010, ‘Turbulent Worlds: Financial Markets and En-
vironmental Crisis’ Th eory, Culture & Society, vol 27, no. 2-3, pp. 
167-190.
Derrida, Jacques 2009, Th e Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1. Chicago, 
Th e University of Chicago Press.
Dillon, Michael and Reid, Julian 2009, Th e Liberal Way of War: Killing 
to Make Life Live. London, Routledge.
Esposito, Roberto 2008, Bíos – Biopolitics and Philosophy. Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press.
Fassin, Didier 2011, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Pre-
sent. Berkelet, University of California Press.
Foucault, Michel 1977, Discipline & Punish: Th e Birth of the Prison. New 
York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, Michel 1990, History of Sexuality, vol. I. New York: Vin-
tage Books.
Foucault, Michel 2003, „Society Must Be Defended“: Lectures at the Col-
lege de France, 1975-76. New York, Picador.
Foucault, Michel 2007, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
College de France, 1977-78. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Genel, Katia 2006, ‘Th e Question of Boppower: Foucault and Agam-
ben, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture and Soci-
ety, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 43-62. 
Hobbes, Th omas 1994, Leviathan. Indiapolis, Hackett Publishing 
Company.
Mbembe, Achille 2003, ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture, vol. 15, no. 1, 
pp. 11-40.
Mills, Catherine 2011, Futures of Reproduction: Bioethics and Biopolitics. 
New York, Springer.
Neal, Andrew W. 2004, Cutting of the Kings Head: Foucault’s ‘Society 
Must be Defended’ and the Problem of Sovereignty, Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 373-398.
Pavlich, George 2009, ‘On the Subejct of Sovereigns’. In Barbour (ed.): 
After Sovereignty: On the Question of Political Beginnings. London, 
Routledge.
Rose, Nikolas 2007, Th e Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and 
Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century. Princeton, Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Wolin Sheldon 1970, Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Th eory. 
Los Angeles, Clark Memorial Library.
Wolin, Sheldon 2004, Politics and Vision – Continuity and Innovation 
in Western Political Th ought. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
56 T IDSSKRIF TE T POLIT IK  HOBBES, SOVEREIGNT Y AND B IOPOLIT ICS
Notes
* I would like to thank Banu Bargu and James Miller for valuable 
comments, as well as the two anonymous reviewers from Tidsskrif-
tet Politik for their engagement with the article.
1. ‘Society Must Be Defended’ is a lecture course held at College de 
France in 1975-1976, and translated to English in 2003. Neal’s ar-
ticle is from 2004. 
2. Th e subjects, of course, have no positive rights against the sovereign, 
not even a Lockean appeal to heaven – they have only the natural 
right of self-preservation – but a system of laws governs the interac-
tions between the subjects (Hobbes, 1994: 114).
3. Again, these rights and duties, freedoms and obligations should not 
be understood as applying to the sovereign, who by contract is out-
side the law. Instead the rights and duties should be understood as 
an ordered, legal space in the state of society contra the total absence 
of positive rights and justice in the state of nature.
4. Even though Hobbes has been depicted as the theorist of absolut-
ism, and even though he favoured absolutism in the actual, English 
politics of his day, Hobbes theory concerns the structural position 
of sovereignty and not absolutism. Th us the sovereign can theoreti-
cally be both an absolute king, an aristocratic body or a popular 
government.
5. By the use of the concept ‘anthropology’ Agamben is obviously not 
referring to academic discipline, but rather to philosophical anthro-
pology, i.e. the understanding of human nature. 
6. Derrida is referring to chapter 14 of Leviathan, page 85.
7. Agamben, in Homo Sacer and with reference to Aristotle, precisely 
attributes zoé to animals, men and Gods, but only bios to politi-
cal, human life (Agamben, 1998: 1). Zoé, in other words, is what 
disappears when the social contract as an anthropological machine 
creates bios.
8. Th e claim here is not that social contract theories always subscribe to 
the transitional model, as this would be too simplistic. In Benedict 
de Spinoza’s contract theory in Th eological Political Treatise (1677), 
for example, no transition takes place, as reason is the sole guid-
ance in both nature and society. Furthermore, theorists without a 
contract element can also be grouped in accordance to the transition 
in human nature and the emergence politics. David Hume under-
stands, for example, in Treatise on Human Nature (1739) self-interest 
and passions to be the universal driving force in human nature, 
whereas Montesquieu in Th e Spirit of the Laws (1748) understands 
the variations in human nature and political experience as a com-
plex interplay between spirit, principle of government and natural 
circumstances. 
